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Gregory Mitchell*
When evidence on the truth or falsity of a proposition is
ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, psychologists warn
about "biased assimilation" of the evidence to support pre-existing
theories, beliefs, and attitudes.1 Therefore, when a skeptic about the
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1. Biased assimilation is said to occur when "the same body of evidence is differentially
evaluated by those on opposite sides of an issue." John W. McHoskey, Case Closed? On the John
F. Kennedy Assassination: Biased Assimilation of Evidence and Attitude Polarization, 17 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 395, 396 (1995). In the classic case of biased assimilation, "[e]vidence
that is supportive of one's position is uncritically accepted, whereas contrary evidence is
scrutinized and (subjectively) discredited." Id.; see also Charles G. Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) ("Thus, there is considerable
evidence that people tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs.
The biased assimilation processes underlying this effect may include a propensity to remember
the strengths of confirming evidence but the weaknesses of disconfirming evidence, to judge
confirming evidence as relevant and reliable but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and
unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at face value while scrutinizing disconfirming
evidence hypercritically."). Anderson and Lindsay differentiate two types of assimilation bias:
(1) a bias to view the perceived relevance and quality of data either positively or negatively in
order to assimilate the data to one's pre-existing views and (2) a bias to perceive two variables to
covary either strongly or weakly in order to assimilate the covariation evidence to pre-existing
views. See Craig A. Anderson & James J. Lindsay, The Development, Perseverance, and Change
of Naive Theories, 16 SOC. COGNITION 8, 17-18 (1998) (discussing "Assimilation Bias # 1" and
"Assimilation Bias # 2").
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public policy implications of psychological research examines the
complex mix of evidence on human rationality, he may find much to
support his skepticism about the use of psychology to reform the law.
Likewise, an optimist about the public policy contributions of
psychology may find within this same body of evidence much to bolster
his optimistic view that psychological research can be used to
refashion the law to better predict and regulate human behavior.
Two of my previous articles on the subject of behavioral law
and economics, 2 or, as I prefer to call the field, legal decision theory,3
and Robert Prentice's excellent discussion of my articles and of legal
decision theory in general may illustrate the biased assimilation
phenomenon at work.4 Indeed, Professor Prentice and I often cite the
very same works to support our different perspectives on legal
decision theory-with Prentice's article emphasizing how much we
know about the quasi-rationality of human judgment and decision
making and my articles emphasizing how little we know in light of the
complexity of the evidence. 5 Notwithstanding the possible influence of
The good news is that a strategy of consciously considering opposing viewpoints and opposite
possibilities has been shown somewhat effective in countering biased-assimilation processes.
See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) ("In two different domains of
social judgment, biased assimilation of new evidence and biased hypothesis testing, and with two
different inducements, direct instructions and indirect manipulation of accessibility through
stimulus salience, the cognitive strategy of considering opposite possibilities promoted
impartiality." (footnote omitted)). Therefore, exchanges such as this one between Professor
Prentice and myself may encourage openmindedness that decreases the likelihood of biased
assimilation of the empirical evidence on human rationality and may even advance the scientific
consideration of the issue: "The ability to see different sides of an issue and to evaluate each
objectively is a hallmark of science." Thomas Lee Budesheim & Arlene Lundquist, Consider the
Opposite: Opening Minds Through In-Class Debates on Course-Related Controversies, 26
TEACHING PSYCHOL. 107, 109 (1999).
2. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Pessimism]; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Incompetence].
3. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1915 n.12 (explaining my preference for the
label "legal decision theory" rather than behavioralism or behavioral law and economics);
Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 78-79 (same).
4. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663 (2003). Professor Prentice's primary goal in this article is to
show that the behavioral law and economics' movement "retains great potential to add valuable
insights to legal scholarship, despite Mitchell's withering attack" on the movement. Id. at 1670.
5. Professor Prentice rightly implies that I am a skeptic, and perhaps even a pessimist,
about the reliability and generalizability of much psychological research, but I do not broadly
view psychological research as bogus or false. See id. at 1718 ("Mitchell's two main points in the
first article appear to be that (a) psychology is a questionable science whose methods
systematically overstate limitations on human judgment, and (b) legal decision theorists have
inexpertly applied its precepts to legal doctrine. He overstates both points.").
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our predispositions, both of our readings of the evidence bring out
valid points about the possibilities and limitations of legal decision
theory.
Not yet content to call our debate a draw or to concede defeat,
however, in this reply to Professor Prentice's article I offer some
additional thoughts in favor of a modest approach to revising the law's
assumption of rationality, as compared to the bolder approach
supported by Professor Prentice. I begin by discussing how the
ambiguous nature of much of the evidence on human rationality may
explain some of the differences between Professor Prentice and me.
Next, I turn to the larger question of whether legal decision theorists
describe behavior at too general a level to be useful in the formulation
of legal policy. In particular, I discuss the tendency of legal decision
theorists to speak in terms of "behavioral tendencies" and how this
approach to behavioral description may impede the progress of
behavioral law and economics. I contend that legal decision theorists
have placed too great an emphasis on finding and describing
behavioral tendencies toward irrationality, without due regard for the
boundary conditions on these supposed tendencies. As a result, much
of the interesting and important information about the constraints on
rational versus irrational behavior is consigned to ceteris paribus
Prentice is correct also to say that I worry that behavioral decision theory overstates
limitations on human cognitive functioning and about legal decision theorists' applications of
behavioral decision theory to the law. For a recent critique of social and cognitive psychology
along these lines, see Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social
Psychology: Causes, Consequences and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social
Behavior and Cognition, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. (forthcoming 2003). It is important to note that
I am not a skeptic about the inaccuracy of the "perfect rational actor" model, as I have repeatedly
emphasized in prior work. See, e.g., Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1936 ("[M]y criticisms
of legal decision theory should not be seen as an argument that human decision makers
predominantly act rationally and only occasionally make computational errors."); Mitchell,
Incompetence, supra note 2, at 69 ("Law and economics' perfect rationality assumption is drawn
from neoclassical microeconomic theory and is refutable as an empirical matter because
empirical studies often find participants whose behavior systematically deviates from economic
definitions of rationality."). The fact that the rational actor model is at times grossly inaccurate
does not necessarily mean, however, that existing behavioral research provides more accurate
empirical models or better prescriptive guidance.
I believe it is fair to label Prentice an optimist about the reliability and generalizability of
psychological research based on statements in his article. For instance, he states that
Mitchell's own sources emphasize that psychology is a respected science with research
that produces results that are often as reliable as those of medical science and that
uses many of the same methods of the hard sciences. Research results in psychology
are roughly as consistent as those in physics, and as reliable as many prominent
findings in medical science.
Prentice, supra note 4, at 1719 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1771 ("Policy prescriptions
based on complicated but very real facts have more promise than those based on elegant but very
wrong theory."). Of course, Prentice may view himself more as a realist than an optimist, that is,
as someone who is giving a realistically optimistic reading of the research.
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clauses and treated as "noise" that should be ignored and controlled
rather than elucidated and understood.
I. IS THE RATIONALITY GLASS HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY?
In back-to-back articles in a recent issue of the Journal of
Economic Perspectives, two prominent economists debate the status of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which in its strong form
predicts that prices in securities markets will perfectly reflect all
relevant and available information, including inside information. 6
This debate raises important questions about whether the market
weeds out irrational behavior on the part of investors, brokers, and
firms and thus has important implications for how the law should
regulate securities markets, as Professor Prentice and others note.7
In the first of these articles, Burton Malkiel surveys behavioral
finance research on market 'anomalies' and statistically significant
predictable patterns in the stock returns" that ostensibly refutes the
efficient markets hypothesis and concludes that
these patterns are not robust and dependable in different sample periods, and some of
the patterns based on fundamental valuation measures of individual stocks may simply
reflect better proxies for measuring risk.
Moreover, many of these patterns, even if they did exist, could self-destruct in the
future, as many of them have already done. Indeed, this is the logical reason why one
should be cautious not to overemphasize these anomalies and predictable patterns....
6. Professor Fama provides perhaps the classic formulation of the hypothesis:
The primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy's
capital stock. In general terms, the ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate
signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make production-
investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that represent
ownership of firms' activities under the assumption that security prices at any time
"fully reflect" all available information. A market in which prices always "fully
reflect" available information is called "efficient."
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383, 383 (1970). Fama acknowledges that more detail must be added to make the thesis
falsifiable. See id. at 384 ("The definitional statement that in an efficient market prices 'fully
reflect' available information is so general that it has no empirically testable implications. To
make the model more testable, the process of price information must be specified in more detail.
In essence we must define somewhat more exactly what is meant by the term 'fully reflect."').
7. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1703-04 (presenting evidence on the survival of
psychological biases and errors in market settings); see also id. at 1725 n.326 (discussing the
debate over the efficiency of markets containing irrational investors). In a recent article,
Professors Choi and Pritchard consider at length possible legal implications of evidence from
behavioral economics on market irrationalities. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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Any truly repetitive and exploitable pattern that can be discovered in the stock market
and can be arbitraged away will self-destruct.8
Malkiel thus predicts ultimate success for the efficient markets model
despite behavioral finance's challenge: "I suspect that the end result
will not be an abandonment of the belief of many in the profession
that the stock market is remarkably efficient in its utilization of
information."9
In the second article, Robert Shiller offers a very different
perspective on the strength of the evidence against the efficient
markets hypothesis:
After all the efforts to defend the efficient markets theory, there is still every reason to
think that, while markets are not totally crazy, they contain quite substantial noise, so
substantial that it dominates the movements in the aggregate market. The efficient
markets model, for the aggregate stock market, has still never been supported by any
study effectively linking stock market fluctuations with subsequent fundamentals. 10
Shiller thus concludes that "[w]hile theoretical models of efficient
markets have their place as illustrations or characterizations of an
ideal world, we cannot maintain them in their pure form as accurate
descriptors of actual markets."11  Indeed, "efficient markets theory
may lead to drastically incorrect interpretations of events such as
major stock market bubbles. '12
At first glance, these conclusions seem strikingly at odds.
Upon looking more closely, however, one sees that Professors Malkiel
and Shiller really do not disagree about the inaccuracy of the efficient
8. Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
59, 71-72 (2003); see also id. at 60 ("I conclude that our stock markets are far more efficient and
far less predictable than some recent academic papers would have us believe."). Professor
Malkiel notes that
[t]he efficient market hypothesis is associated with the idea of a "random walk," which
is a term loosely used in the finance literature to characterize a price series where all
subsequent price changes represent random departures from previous prices. The
logic of the random walk idea is that if the flow of information is unimpeded and
information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow's price change will
reflect only tomorrow's news and will be independent of the price changes today. But
news is by definition unpredictable, and, thus, resulting price changes must be
unpredictable and random. As a result, prices fully reflect all known information, and
even uninformed investors buying a diversified portfolio at the tableau of prices given
by the market will obtain a rate of return as generous as that achieved by the experts.
Id. at 59. In other words, under the efficient markets hypothesis, stock prices should be
unpredictable, and so evidence of predictable changes in stock prices refutes the hypothesis but
should also provide profiteering opportunities to those who can successfully predict the price
changes.
9. Id. at 80.
10. Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 83, 90 (2003).
11. Id. at 102.
12. Id. at 101.
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capital markets hypothesis, but simply differ in their views about the
importance of the behavioral finance evidence. Whereas Malkiel
argues that the efficient markets model, despite its failures, provides a
better investment guide than the collection of anomalies found within
behavioral finance, Shiller argues that behavioral finance research
falsifies the efficient markets hypothesis in several important respects
regardless of whether the anomalies revealed through this research
translate into profit opportunities.13
Similar evaluative processes are at work in the recent
assessments of legal decision theory by Professor Prentice and me.
Professor Prentice emphasizes how thoroughly behavioral research
refutes the rational actor hypothesis embraced by law and economics,
and he provides an impressive array of examples of this refutation. I
accept that the rational actor hypothesis has been refuted, but I
question the robustness of these refutations and argue that their
implications for the law are not clear (i.e., Prentice emphasizes the
bounds on rationality, while I emphasize the bounds on
irrationality.)14 The enabling factor behind our equally credible but
13. Compare Shiller, supra note 10, at 101 ("In judging the impact of behavioral finance to
date, it is important to apply the right standards. Of course, we do not expect such research to
provide a method to make a lot of money off of financial market inefficiency very fast and
reliably."), with Malkiel, supra note 8, at 60 ("[T]he evidence is overwhelming that whatever
anomalous behavior of stock prices may exist, it does not create a portfolio trading opportunity
that enables investors to earn extraordinary risk adjusted returns."). Malkiel further writes:
What I do not argue is that market pricing is always perfect. After the fact, we know
that markets have made egregious mistakes, as I think occurred during the recent
Internet "bubble." Nor do I deny that psychological factors influence securities prices.
But I am convinced that Benjamin Graham was correct in suggesting that while the
stock market in the short run may be a voting mechanism, in the long run it is a
weighing mechanism. True value will win out in the end. Before the fact, there is no
way in which investors can reliably exploit any anomalies or patterns that might
exist. I am skeptical that any of the "predictable patterns" that have been
documented in the literature were ever sufficiently robust so as to have created
profitable investment opportunities, and after they have been discovered and
publicized, they will certainly not allow investors to earn excess returns.
Malkiel, supra note 8, at 61 (citation omitted). Shiller further writes:
[Tihe mere fact that anomalies sometimes disappear or switch signs with time is no
evidence that the markets are fully rational. That is also what we would expect to see
happen even in highly irrational markets. (It would seem peculiar to argue that
irrational markets should display regular and lasting patterns!)
Shiller, supra note 10, at 102.
14. Several years ago Keren and Wagenaar made the useful point that there are bounds on
both our rationality and irrationality. See Gideon Keren & Willem A. Wagenaar, On the
Psychology of Playing Blackjack: Normative and Descriptive Considerations with Implications for
Decision Theory, 114 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 133, 157 (1985) ("The players
observed in the present study could be well described by what Simon has termed as bounded
rationality or quasi rationality. Their intuitions are clearly limited and error prone. Yet, they
are also setting constraints on the use of wrong beliefs and heuristics which may potentially be
misleading.... To make the description more complete, we would also characterize the players
1786
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different perspectives on legal decision theory is the complex nature of
the evidence on human rationality.
Good illustrations of the ambiguous implications of this body of
evidence are found in instances where Professor Prentice and I rely on
precisely the same research to reach different conclusions. As a first
example, consider the case of whether financial incentives improve
performance on tests of rational thinking, an important question
because such tests most commonly employ hypothetical as opposed to
real payoffs. 15 Professor Prentice cites a literature review by Camerer
and Hogarth on the effects of financial incentives on rational behavior
for the proposition that .'[t]he most common result is that incentives
did not affect mean performance."'' 16 This proposition supports
Prentice's view that, often, studies using hypothetical payoffs yield the
same results as studies using real payoffs. I, on the other hand, rely
on the same work for the proposition that, "as Camerer and Hogarth
as being guided by what might be termed as bounded irrationality. We speculate that this latter
description can be generalized beyond the limited context of playing blackjack." (citation
omitted)).
15. For example, many experiments on decision making under risk use hypothetical
gambles to examine whether subjects' preferences are consistent with the predictions of
subjective expected utility theory or whether they show systematic deviations from the
predictions of how a perfectly rational actor would act under expected utility theory. See, e.g.,
Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
587, 589 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) ("In the psychology experiments, subjects
are often not paid according to their performance, or are paid small amounts; stimuli have
natural labels that may induce nonmonetary utilities; subjects do not always make repeated
choices under stationary replication; treatments are sometimes created by deceiving subjects;
and so forth. As a result, many economists discount evidence from the psychologists' studies.").
16. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1751-52 (citing Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The
Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital -Labor-Production
Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 22 (1999)). Prentice further states:
In some judgment and decision tasks, incentives often hurt performance. In some
areas where concentration and attention are important, financial incentives often do
improve decision making by increasing the subject's motivation and/or attention, but
Stone and Ziebart note that "financial incentives are no panacea for eliminating
decision biases. Instead, incentives appear to increase the extent of attention given to
a task, but also to increase potentially distracting emotions." Kuhberger and
colleagues list several examples of important areas where no significant differences
were found between hypothetical and real decisions, concluding "the general
consensus among psychologists seems to be that hypothetical choices give a
reasonable, qualitatively correct picture of real choices." They then pursued their own
study and found that similar preference reversals regarding framing were obtained
using both hypothetical and real decisions for both small and large payoffs. These
results are supported by the numerous studies cited above where laboratory results
were confirmed in the field.
Id. at 1752 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1748 ("[Sltudies generally show that there is not
much difference between laboratory decision making and real world decision making." (footnote
omitted)). He does note some evidence of differences in results, however. Id. at 1748 n.449
("There certainly are studies showing differences in some contexts when incentives are
introduced." (citations omitted)).
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emphasize, the existing data [on the effect of financial incentives]
cannot properly be summarized in simple, dichotomous terms.
Sometimes decisions with material consequences are the same as
decisions without material consequences; sometimes they are
different."' 7
On this point, it is worth noting that Vernon Smith, who, as
Prentice indicates, was a co-recipient with Daniel Kahneman of the
2003 Nobel Prize for economics,' 8 has recently written that "[a]nyone
who doubts that payoffs can and do matter has not looked at the
evidence. What is not predictable by any theory is what situations
will be sensitive at what payoff levels and what situations will not be
sensitive at the levels commonly used."'19 Smith's statement accords
with my intended point: much remains to be learned about material
incentives and rational behavior, and, just as we should not assume
incentives are a panacea for eliminating judgmental biases and
decision errors-Prentice's point-we should likewise not ignore the
possible effects of incentives.
In another example of our divergent interpretations of the
same evidence, Professor Prentice emphasizes the empirically
informed, yet primarily theoretical, analysis by Kerr, MacCoun, and
Kramer to the effect that group deliberation will often not prevent the
appearance of psychological biases. 20 In contrast, I emphasize the
empirical analysis by Kerr and his colleagues to support the
proposition that there are no simple conclusions when it comes to
groups and psychological biases: "In some cases, group deliberations
and collective decisionmaking moderate bias, in some cases they have
no apparent net effect, and in some cases they amplify bias."2 1 Again,
17. Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 119; see also Camerer & Hogarth, The Effects of
Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1999) ("The extreme positions, that incentives make no difference at
all, or always eliminate persistent irrationalities, are false.").
18. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1775 n.585.
19. Vernon L. Smith, Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON.
91, 101-02 (2002).
20. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1715 ("Similarly, in 1996 Kerr and his colleagues
reviewed all the studies they could find regarding differences in individual and group bias, and
concluded that there is little difference between group and individual bias." (footnote omitted)).
Prentice cites to portions of the Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer article drawing conclusions from a
theoretical analysis (based on the social decision scheme model) of how different types of groups
are likely to be affected by the biases of individual group members. See id. at 1715 nn.273-75
(citing Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713-14 (1996)).
21. Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 2004. Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer draw the
following conclusion from their review of then-existing empirical data:
The central question of this paper has been, "Which is more likely to make a biased
judgment, individuals or groups?" Our overview of the relatively small and diverse
[Vol. 56:17811788
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I caution against simple extrapolations from the evidence, while
Professor Prentice focuses on the fact that group deliberation does not
provide refuge for proponents of the rationality assumption.
As a final illustration of our differing interpretations, Professor
Prentice notes that Vernon Smith's work on experimental markets
reveals that feedback and market experience do not completely
extinguish irrational behavior,22 whereas I cite Smith's work to show
that behavior in single-decision and repeated-decision settings does
differ at times and that some learning does occur in market settings. 23
Recent evidence on the issue of whether markets foster rational
behavior further illustrates the difficulty in reaching simple
conclusions in the rationality-irrationality debate. In two sets of
studies into the impact of market forces on the appearance and
survival of anomalous decision-making behavior, the economist John
List found that level of experience in the marketplace mediates
rationality. In one set of studies of a naturally occurring market, List
found that prospect theory predicted the behavior of inexperienced
consumers while neoclassical microeconomic theory predicted the
behavior of experienced consumers. 24 In a second set of market
studies, List found evidence of an endowment effect that dissipated
empirical literature suggested that there was no simple empirical answer to this
question. Even when we restrict our attention to particular bias phenomena (e.g.,
framing effects, preference reversals), there was frequently little consistency in the
direction (i.e., sign) and magnitude of observed relative bias, RB.
Kerr et al., supra note 20, at 713.
22. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1704 ("Even the repeat games of experimental economist
and Nobel Prize winner Vernon Smith demonstrated that the stock market, the market most
likely of all markets to be efficient, often is not .... Even repeat professional players in the
financial markets-players who have time and incentive to perform well-are subject to many of
the heuristics and biases that have been identified in lay persons by one-shot laboratory
experiments." (footnotes omitted)).
23. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1978 & n.144; Mitchell, Incompetence, supra
note 2, at 165-66 & n.299.
24. JOHN A. LIST, NEOCLASSICAL THEORY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY: EVIDENCE FROM THE
MARKETPLACE 24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w9736, 2003) ("In this
study, I make use of three clean tests that pit neoclassical theory against prospect theory. I test
the three hypotheses with data generated from a naturally occurring market. Examining trading
patterns and bid/offer schedules in actual auctions for everyday consumables yields several
unique insights. First, prospect theory is found to have strong predictive power for inexperienced
consumers across both the trading and auction treatments. Second, for those consumers that
have had a considerable amount of exchange opportunity in the sportscard marketplace,
neoclassical theory predicts reasonably well, as I find sharp evidence that behavior approaches
the neoclassical prediction for experienced agents. In light of the extant body of psychological
evidence that reports limited transfer of learning across tasks, these results are quite surprising.
The tentative conclusion regarding the underlying learning process at work is that agents with
intense market experience have learned to part with entitlements, suggesting attenuation of the
anomaly appears to take place on the sell side of the market rather than on the buy side."),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9736.
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appreciably with trading experience, with behavior converging toward
the neoclassical prediction as experience intensified. 25 Thus, while
market forces may not entirely extinguish irrational behavior, these
forces may have important positive effects on behavior.
Despite the different lessons we draw from the mixed evidence
on rationality, and these examples do not exhaust our differences in
interpretation,26 Professor Prentice and I do agree in some important
25. John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41,
70-71 (2003) ("In this study, I depart from traditional experimental investigation by observing
actual market behavior. Examining behavior in four field experiments across disparate markets
yields several unique insights. First, the field data suggest that there is an overall endowment
effect. Second, within both institutions-observed trading rates and explicit value revelation-I
find strong evidence that individual behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading
experience intensifies .... These results provide initial evidence consistent with the notion that
market experience eliminates market anomalies.").
It should be noted that Professor List is not among the group of economists who refuse to
accept the findings of behavioral economics, but he does seek to test the generalizability of
experimental results. Sometimes his tests reveal strong support for behavioral economics'
amendments to rational choice theory. For instance, in a study of undergraduates and
experienced futures and options floor traders, Haigh and List found that, "while both traders and
students fall prey to MLA [myopic loss aversion], traders fall prey to MLA to a greater extent
than students .... [Ojur findings suggest that expected utility theory may not model professional
traders' behavior as well, and this finding lends credence to behavioral economics and finance
models, which are beginning to relax the rationality assumptions used in standard financial
economics." MICHAEL S. HAIGH & JOHN A. LIST, Do PROFESSIONAL TRADERS EXHIBIT MYOPIC
Loss AVERSION? AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 9 (Univ. of Maryland, Dept. of Agric. & Econ.
Resources, Working Paper No. 02-18, 2002), http://www.arec.umd.edu/publications/papers/
working-papers-PDF-files/02-18.pdf.
For a recent study finding that repeated play within an experimental market reduced the
hindsight bias, see Tarek El-Sehity et al., Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude Within
the Context of Experimental Asset Markets, 3 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 227, 233 (2002) ("Our
results do not support the conjecture that traders in an experimental asset market are prone to
hindsight bias in remembering their price predictions. Moreover, our results show that
hindsight bias is not generally present; rather, it was moderated by the methodology in use.
This result may be content-specific. In studies with almanac questions, hindsight bias seems
robust, but in our experimental approach, personal experience and feedback about financial
performance may crowd out the bias. Another explanation for our finding may be the within-
subjects design itself, more specifically an asymmetry in the ability to draw on prior
information.").
26. Two others areas of debate merit brief mention. The first concerns the "experimental
conversations" program of research that arose out of Kahneman and Tversky's own concerns
about the settings in which so many cognitive heuristics are tested. See Mitchell, Pessimism,
supra note 2, at 1980-81. Whereas Prentice reads the research on the effects of conversational
cues to be "irrelevant to experiments regarding many of the heuristics and biases in the K-T
tradition" but "particularly relevant to the dilution effect," Prentice, supra note 4, at 1706, I read
this research to be relevant to the strength of the evidence for several of the biases and errors
that legal decision theorists discuss. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1983-84 (citing
research on the influence of conversational conventions and cues on the use of base rate
information, the fundamental attribution error, susceptibility of eyewitnesses to misleading
questions, the conjunction fallacy, primacy effects, framing effects, judgmental overconfidence,
and the dilution effect).
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respects on the lessons to be learned. We agree most broadly that
economic models of behavior are often quite inaccurate and that
psychological models are sometimes more accurate. Nevertheless, we
disagree on the conditions under which we can declare "K-T Man" a
better model than "Chicago Man." In other words, we agree that
revision or replacement of the rational actor model is appropriate, but
we debate the details of how, when, and to what extent such revisions
should occur. 27
I take a cautious approach to prescription that seeks to target
the persons who may be most prone to irrationality without adversely
affecting those who are not. I therefore suggest a few possible
procedural reforms that might have this effect, 28 an approach similar
Also, I do not believe the evidence is quite as clear as Prentice suggests that behavior in
within-subjects experiments often mirrors behavior in between-subjects experiments. See
Prentice, supra note 4, at 1685 ("In short, psychologists often study the same phenomena with
both between-subjects and within-subjects studies and usually (but not invariably) find similar
results," (footnote omitted)). But see Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness
Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 72 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("Between-
subjects and factorial designs often yield different results in studies of intuitive judgment."). In
fact, if within-subjects and between-subjects designs did commonly yield similar results without
changes to the experimental design, we would probably see many more within-subjects designs
because they require fewer subjects and often less time, increase the power of the study, and
allow the subject to act as her own control within the study-all very attractive features. See
Elizabeth J. Heillier, Within-Subject Designs, in LABORATORY PSYCHOLOGY: A BEGINNGER'S
GUIDE 39, 45-46 (Julia Nunn ed., 1998). However, for some of the very reasons that Prentice
notes, such as demand characteristics and carryover effects, see Prentice, supra note 4, at 1680-
81, subject behavior in within-subjects designs does often differ from that in between-subjects
designs, making within-subject designs less common in heuristic and bias research. See Albert
Erlebacher, Design and Analysis of Experiments Contrasting the Within- and Between-Subjects
Manipulation of the Independent Variable, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 212, 212 (1977) ('Many
experiments have shown, however, that the two experimental designs do not always yield similar
results."); Paul A. Klaczynski et al., Goal-Oriented Critical Reasoning and Individual Differences
in Critical Reasoning Biases, 89 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 470, 472 (1997) ("Research on the biased
application of reasoning strategies has typically been conducted with between-subjects designs.
Reasoning biases are demonstrated when one group readily assimilates the enhancing
information to their existing beliefs and a second group uses complex reasoning to reject
threatening information." (citations omitted)); see also J. MERRILL CARLSMITH ET AL., METHODS
OF RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (1st ed. 1976) ("In social-psychological experiments,
within-subjects designs are rare. This is because in many research situations there is a strong
probability that participation in one condition will influence, or 'contaminate,' a subject's
response to the second condition."); Erlebacher, supra, at 212 ("Most experiments in personality
or social psychology tend to be performed with a between-subjects design.").
27. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1720 ("In other words, to some extent we are now arguing
about details. Mitchell essentially admits this. He does not argue that the Chicago Man model
in any way approximates how people actually act. He does not reject the psychological analysis
of law. It is the details he quibbles over, and the scientific work of nailing down those details
will be ongoing for a long, long time." (footnotes omitted)).
28. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 132-35 (discussing possible "do no harm"
reforms, including statistical training for judges, presentation of evidence in frequency and
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to the "asymmetric paternalism" approach recently discussed by Colin
Camerer and his colleagues. 29 Professor Prentice, however, believes
that I have been "unduly timid in failing to embrace numerous other
policy prescriptions offered by legal decision theorists."30 Eventually I
may overcome my admitted prescriptive timidity, but I believe we still
have much to learn about the conditions under which we act rationally
and irrationally before we attempt wide-scale reforms, as Camerer
and his colleagues likewise suggested recently:
The scientific consolidation of psychological findings into a new brand of behavioral
economic theory breathes new life into the rationales for paternalistic regulation .... In
a sense, behavioral economics extends the paternalistically protected category of "idiots"
to include most people, at predictable times. The challenge is figuring out what sorts of
"idiotic" behaviors are likely to arise routinely and how to prevent them, while imposing
minimal restrictions on those who behave rationally.3 1
One way to obtain a better idea of when we do and do not act
like "idiots" is through the meta-analytic synthesis of existing
judgment and decision-making research, another important point on
which I believe Professor Prentice and I agree. 32 A single meta-
analytic study, using systematic techniques for the estimation of effect
sizes and effect parameters over collections of studies, may provide
probability formats, jury instructions that encourage active, open-minded thinking, and the
exposition requirements to debias risk assessments).
29. See Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue &
Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
'Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003) ("Our purpose in this Article is
to argue that in many cases it is possible to have one's cake and eat it too. We propose an
approach to evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines that we call 'asymmetric
paternalism.' A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those
who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational. Such
regulations are relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best interest,
while at the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices." (footnote omitted)).
30. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1763.
31. Camerer et al., supra note 29, at 1218; see also id. at 1254 ("To sum up: asymmetric
paternalism helps those whose rationality is bounded from making a costly mistake and harms
more rational folks very little. Such policies should appeal to everyone across the political
spectrum and can potentially shift the debate from one about whether or not paternalism is
justified, to one about whether the benefits of mistake prevention are larger than the harms
imposed on rational people. The idea is designed to foster debates about paternalism on these
empirical terms. Creating a sharp empirical debate may, in turn, encourage social scientists and
lawyers to generate new answers.").
32. Although Professor Prentice properly notes that meta-analysis has its limitations,
Prentice, supra note 4, at 1689 ("For example, several critics of [null hypothesis significance
testing] have supported greater use of confidence intervals, model fitting, and meta-analyses,
although these statistical methods have their own limitations." (footnotes omitted)), he does not
affirmatively deny its potential value and he does cite favorably findings from meta-analytic
studies. See id. at 1691-93. For a discussion of criticisms of meta-analysis, see R. Rosenthal &
M.R. DiMatteo, Meta-analysis: Recent Developments in Quantitative Methods for Literature
Reviews, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 59, 66-68 (2001).
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more useful information for policy-making purposes than hundreds of
individual studies. 33 So Prentice and I can each cite numerous studies
whose individual statistically significant results seem to provide
strong support for our respective views-as we each do-but in the
end these studies provide limited information about subsets of people
acting in subsets of situations, and numerous inferences and
judgments must be made to extend the findings more broadly.
Although meta-analysis does not obviate the need for such inferences
and judgments, it provides a much more systematic and reliable basis
for them than qualitative literature reviews.3 4
Perhaps most importantly, Professor Prentice and I agree that
predictable individual and situational differences exist in rational
behavior and that legal decision theory must take these differences
into account. Thus, it makes no sense for legal decision theorists to
speak of legal actors as if they are all "equally incompetent":
individuals are not equally likely to fall prey to cognitive illusions, and
situations are not equally likely to elicit irrational behavior. On this
point, Professor Prentice asserts that a careful reading of legal
decision theory would lead one to conclude that legal decision theorists
33. See Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 61 ('Meta-analysis allows the combining of
numerical results from a few or many studies, the accurate estimation of descriptive statistics
and the explanation of inconsistencies as well as the discovery of moderators and mediators in
bodies of research findings."). For examples of just such useful meta.analyses, see Jay J.J.
Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991); Anton Kfihberger et al.,
The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks, 78
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 204 (1999); Anton Krlhberger, The
Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN
DECISION PROCESSES 23 (1998); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of
"Responsibility": A Meta-analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575 (2000).
Although a meta-analysis can be quite useful in organizing findings from a large number of
studies, note that a large number of studies is not a prerequisite to meta-analysis. See MARK W.
LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 7 (2001) ("We hasten to add, however,
that meta-analysis does not require large numbers of studies and, in some circumstances, can be
usefully applied to as few as two or three study findings.").
34. See HARRIS COOPER, SYNTHESIZING RESEARCH 2 (3d ed. 1998) ("A social scientist
performing a research synthesis makes numerous decisions that affect the outcomes of his or her
work. Each choice may create threats to the outcome's trustworthiness. Therefore, if social
science knowledge contained in research syntheses is to be believable, research synthesists must
be required to meet the same rigorous methodological standards that are applied to primary
researchers."); Rosenthal & DiMattteo, supra note 32, at 61-62 ("Reviews of research have been
valuable to many fields, but when presented and described only qualitatively, the results of
conflicting studies can be confusing. Qualitative or narrative methods approach controversy by
listing and describing conflicting findings, and sometimes by trying to group or otherwise
configure those that have various types of results or outcomes. Yet, it may be all too tempting
for authors of narrative reviews consciously or unconsciously to select and describe studies to
support their own understanding of the literature and/or their own established theoretical
positions.").
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have always believed in the situation- and person-specific nature of
irrational behavior. In other words, my argument against the "equal
incompetence" model of thought-the cognitive model that I contend
was developing within legal decision theory-is a fight against a straw
man. 35 Jeffrey Rachlinski similarly accuses me of the "cheap academic
stunt" of "[mlischaracterizing a line of scholarship and then attacking
that mischaracterization." 36  Although Professors Prentice and
Rachlinski accept my case for the context-dependence of irrationality,
they contend that legal scholars already knew this and had been
acting as if they knew it.37
I find my indictment on this point a bit hard to swallow when
overly broad and empirically dubious claims about behavior continue
to appear within the legal decision theory literature, such as in the
following examples (on top of the numerous examples I cited in my
previous articles):38
35. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1722 ("Mitchell's second article, his Equal Incompetence
article, erects and tears down a giant straw man. He claims that while economists err by
assuming that man is always rational, legal decision theorists err by assuming that man is
always irrational. Contrary to this claim of assumed 'equal incompetence' on behalf of all people
in all situations, legal decision theorists recognize individual and situational variations."
(footnote omitted)).
36. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1167 n.18 (2003).
37. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1722 ("Contrary to [Mitchell's] claim of assumed 'equal
incompetence' on behalf of all people in all situations, legal decision theorists recognize
individual and situational variations."); Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 1167 n.18 ("To be sure, the
author of these studies successfully refutes the claim that context or incentives do not affect the
magnitude of the cognitive phenomena that psychologists have observed. Inasmuch as no one
has ever advocated such a position, however, it is hard to see the value of such a refutation.").
38. In both of my articles in question, I quote at length numerous empirical claims within
legal decision theory that I found troubling. See, e.g., Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1917
n.15, 1918-20 n.18; Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 69 n.2, 70-72 nn.4-7, 84-85 n.41. In
these articles, I acknowledge that not all legal decision theorists share exactly the same views
and that at various points we find some cautionary statements to accompany the bold
statements. See, e.g., Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1915 n.12 ("Of course, not all legal
decision theorists will subscribe to every claim made by every other legal decision theorist, and
no single legal decision theory yet exists. To limit confusion and increase the fairness of my
remarks, I attempt to provide as much detail as possible on who has made what particular
claims, including direct quotation of the statements at issue."); id. at 1933 n.44 ("Legal decision
theorists generally express caution in the introductions and conclusions of their articles, often
with respect to policy arguments, but seem to abandon this caution at other points in the same
articles and particularly with respect to empirical claims, making at times very broad,
unqualified statements about the scope of research findings."); Mitchell, Incompetence, supra
note 2, at 85 n.41 ("We see at times in the works of legal decision theory some equivocation on
the strength of the claim of equal incompetence, but the basic belief in the universality of flawed
information-processing and inferential processes seems to prevail in the end."). Prentice himself
notes my caveats. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1721 ("Indeed, in his more candid moments,
Mitchell admits that 'legal decision theorists generally express caution about their endeavor and
note the preliminary nature of much of their work .. (quoting Mitchell, supra note 2, at
1933) (footnote omitted)).
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Psychologists, however, offer evidence that people rely on heuristics (rules of thumb)
rather than investing in information, make decisions using unconscious biases, and
frequently fail to respond to changes in incentives. These imperfections in cognition,
memory, and decisionmaking occur regardless of the decisionmaker's education or socio-
cultural background.
39
[R]esearch demonstrates that [these biases] apply to all of us, not just a benighted
unfortunate few. Further, while these biases do not invariably operate in all cases, they
are fairly resistant to correction through education. So, there is little or no correlation
between these biases and education or intelligence.
40
A scholar who took these statements at face value, even with their
vague qualifications, would obtain an incorrect understanding of the
effect of incentives, education, intelligence, and culture on rationality,
because these statements understate the importance of these
variables. 41
In fact, after characterizing my concerns as overblown,
Professors Prentice and Rachlinski both acknowledge some
overreaching within the ranks of legal decision theory. In Professor
Prentice's words, some legal decision theorists may have fallen into
"the overadvocacy trap,"' 42 and, in Professor Rachlinski's words, "the
notion that people make systematically erroneous choices ... has been
overlearned and overapplied by legal scholars."43 So it turns out that
39. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 589 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
40. Tamara Piety, "Merchants of Discontent" An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377,
404 (2001) (footnote omitted).
41. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 87-94 (discussing evidence that education
can improve performance on some rationality tests); id. at 94-98 (discussing evidence that
intelligence and susceptibility to several cognitive biases are related); id. at 114-19 (discussing
evidence that financial incentives may, in some cases, affect the frequency or magnitude of
irrational behavior); id. at 132-35 (discussing evidence on ways to debias the person or
environment); id. at 147-56 (discussing evidence of cultural variation in rationality).
42. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1773-74 ("Ardent supporters of legal decision theory have no
doubt painted an enthusiastic picture of the potential that it has for informing legal analysis,
and some may have fallen into the overadvocacy trap." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1722
("This certainly does not mean that errors have not crept into the policy precepts of legal decision
theorists, or that they will not do so. But it is the proponents of K-T Man, rather than those of
Chicago Man, who have a fighting chance of usefully formulating legal doctrine based on how
people actually make decisions.").
43. Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 1168. Later Professor Rachlinski adds
Legal scholars have either misunderstood or misapplied behavioral decision theory.
The psychological research itself is not designed solely to uncover error; it is designed
to identify how people think. The chief lesson of behavioral decision theory is not
people make bad choices but that they do not rely on rule-based systems, such as
deductive logic or expected utility theory in making decisions.
Id. at 1206-07.
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Professors Prentice and Rachlinski express some of the same concerns
that motivated my articles. 44
Given these common concerns about "overadvocacy," how can it
be that I view many claims by legal decision theorists as cavalier and
neglectful of important contextual influences on behavior, while
Professor Prentice defends these same claims as careful and duly
mindful of contextual influences? 45 Part of the answer lies, no doubt,
in our different readings of the underlying empirical evidence that
translate into different degrees of certainty about the state of our
knowledge, as discussed above, but I believe there is another
explanation as well. A large part of the gap between our perspectives
derives, it seems to me, from different comfort levels with the concept
of "behavioral tendencies" and different views about the appropriate
level of generality for describing behavior. Understanding these
differences may help explain why I am less willing to infer legal
prescriptions from the psychological research than Professor Prentice.
44. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 2020-21 ("Progress is unlikely, however, so
long as legal decision theorists fail to specify the boundary conditions on their empirical claims
and instead settle for overly broad generalizations about nonrationality to compete with the
economic theorists' overly broad generalizations about. rationality."); Mitchell, Incompetence,
supra note 2, at 138-39 ("Although the criticisms directed here at legal decision theory may
mistakenly lead some readers to conclude that this Article's primary purpose is to defend
conventional law and economics and trivialize behavioral law and economics, the real goal is to
encourage greater fidelity to existing empirical data and encourage a more sophisticated
approach to the study of legal behavior. Legal decision theory pushes legal scholars and
lawmakers to examine the behavioral assumptions that underlie legal concepts and why these
assumptions were chosen. This inquiry may be tremendously valuable.").
Of particular note, Professor Rachlinski and I agree that an empirical demonstration of
heuristic processing should not be equated with poor judgment or decision making. See Mitchell,
Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1973 ("Recall that the use of cognitive heuristics is adaptive, for
heuristic processing often leads to the same result as does more systematic information-
processing that requires greater effort or resources. Indeed, heuristic processing may lead to the
normative result with a high degree of frequency." (footnotes omitted)); Mitchell, Incompetence,
supra note 2, at 108 ("[I]t is the experimenter who may well be committing an error by labeling a
subject's choice irrational without first examining the subject's motives and beliefs about the
decision situation." (footnote omitted)); Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 1219 ("The road from
identification of a heuristic to the use of that heuristic to justify supplanting individual choice is
much longer than has been noted in the literature thus far. Even though psychological research
on judgment and choice suggests that people usually use heuristics to make choices, the reliance
on heuristics does not necessarily suggest that people make chronically bad decisions. People's
ability to learn good approaches to problems might ensure that they can make good choices most
of the time.").
45. Compare Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 139 (Legal decision theorists'
"important inquiry needs to be conducted using data rather than mere words, and claims to
empirical truth need to be made less cavalierly."), with Prentice, supra note 4, at 1724 ("Because
legal decision scholars are necessarily sensitive to the fact that the complex human reasoning
and judgment processes are anything but universal and uniform, Mitchell is unable in either of
his articles to meaningfully challenge a single policy prescription by any legal decision scholar.").
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II. TENDENCIES, CETERIS PARIBUS CLAUSES, AND BOUNDARY
CONDITIONS
As a partial rebuttal to my criticism of legal decision theorists'
aggressive behavioral claims, Professor Prentice emphasizes that legal
decision theorists often speak in terms of behavioral tendencies rather
than universal patterns of behavior:
Contrary to this claim of assumed "equal incompetence" on behalf of all people in all
situations, legal decision theorists recognize individual and situational variations. Some
of Mitchell's own cited sources make this explicit by stating that the psychological
evidence shows that people "frequently" or "often" think in ways that depart from
accepted norms of rationality.
4 6
Professor Prentice is correct that talk of behavioral tendencies-talk
of how "people" (in general? all? most? some?) "often" or "frequently"
act-surely does admit of some individual or situational variation in
behavior, for if all people do not always act the same way, then there
must be some behavioral variation. We find such talk of behavioral
tendencies throughout the empirical legal literature, including in
some of my own work,47 because in the behavioral sciences we discover
46. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1722 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1726 ("Mitchell cites
no legal decision theorist who has told his or her audience that educated and uneducated people
always fall prey to the same illusions, and I cannot imagine that one has done so. Nor does
Mitchell cite any legal decision scholar who has based a policy prescription upon such an
assumption. Mitchell could have cited several theorists who have claimed that educated and
uneducated people usually fall prey to the same illusions at roughly the same rates, and Mitchell
would have great difficulty discrediting such statements."). I previously noted concern about the
use of vague qualifiers to condition the claims of legal decision theorists:
Inferring generalizations about behavior from aggregated data may be a defensible, if
imprecise, practice, but only when this inferential leap and its basis are made clear.
Virtually all of the claims of the legal decision theorists are general-type propositions
inferred from aggregate-type propositions without explication as such, and without
any discussion of how findings of statistical significance alone can support the
generalizations. One finds, at most, linguistic hedges, such as the data "suggest"
some effect or some effect "generally" occurs, but not outright admissions that legal
decision theory is founded on generalizations that are shakily inferred from
aggregated data in between-subjects experiments.
Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1969 (footnotes omitted).
47. See, e.g., Kevin Barton, Game Over! Legal Responses to Video Game Violence, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 133, 138 (2002) ("Several empirical investigations on the effects
of violent video games link such games to children's behavioral tendencies."); A. Mechele
Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3
(2003) ("Given the well-established behavioral tendency for actors to be overconfident about the
risk that bad things will happen, it is somewhat predictable that directors will be unwilling to
place firms in bankruptcy since doing so acknowledges that they lack the ability to save the
business or, even worse, may have made decisions that contributed to the firm's financial crisis."
(footnotes omitted)); Reid Hastie, Emotions in Jurors' Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991, 1002
(2001) ("A person in an angry emotional state would have an increased 'action tendency' to
behave aggressively, sympathy would evoke protective and restitutive tendencies, fear would
instigate escape or self-protective behaviors, and so forth. Either account would imply that
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tendencies and probabilities, rather than universals and certainties. 48
Hence, the use of tendency talk is not per se objectionable.
Nevertheless, speaking in terms of behavioral tendencies can
have negative consequences, particularly for an applied field of work
such as legal decision theory. The overriding problem is that this
tendency talk obscures the complexity of the relations among
behavior, cognition, motivation, emotion, and the environment. Given
what we now know of important boundary conditions on judgmental
biases and decision-making errors (i.e., with what strength and
frequency, for whom, and in what situations are these tendencies
likely to hold?), to say that people tend to exhibit this or that tendency
without expressing the boundary conditions on it omits important
information from a policy-making standpoint. The point I have been
inducing an emotional state would result in a systematic behavioral tendency, and that such a
tendency could influence legally relevant judgments." (footnotes omitted)); Mitchell, Pessimism,
supra note 2, at 2011 ("The precise words used in a law or a contract and the subject matter or
domain of the law or contract, not to mention the characteristics of the legal actors and
characteristics of the larger social context, may dramatically affect whether and to what extent
different behavioral tendencies (most typically in the form of different risk preferences) are
observed across positive and negative framings of formally equivalent judgment and choice
options."); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 448-49 (2003) ("In many settings in which it is possible to
evaluate the quality of decisions, the addition of certain types of information leads to a less
reliable, lower-quality decision. This is because human decision makers tend to make systematic
errors in the way they combine pieces of information." (footnote omitted)); Prentice, supra note 4,
at 1666-67 ("A 'mountain of experiments' performed in psychology and related disciplines, much
of it in the 'heuristics and biases' tradition founded by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, demonstrate that people tend to deviate systematically from rational norms when they
make decisions." (footnotes omitted)); Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 1170 ("People tend to base
judgments of frequency on 'the ease with which instances of occurrences can be brought to
mind."' (footnote omitted)); Susan J. Stabile, Another Look at 401(k) Plan Investments in
Employer Securities, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 564 (2002) ("Over-investment in employer
securities represents another significant problem with 401(k) plans. Given the freedom to do so,
participants invest disproportionately in the stock of their employers. They do so because of
various behavioral tendencies that are not susceptible to change through increased education
efforts.").
48. The use of descriptive abstractions, in the form of people tend to do this or that, becomes
unavoidable once outside the realm of biography or limited historical description. While the
social sciences often strive for universal laws of behavior, the complex and changing nature of
the world makes finding such laws extremely difficult, if not impossible, and leaves contingent
and incomplete descriptions of behavioral regularities perhaps the best that we can do (i.e., we
must speak in terms of imperfect rather than perfect correlations between variables). See, e.g.,
Robyn M. Dawes, The Nature of Human Nature: An Empirical Case for Withholding Judgment-
Perhaps Indefinitely, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 81, 92 (1995) ("In conclusion, we simply don't know
enough beyond our benchmark knowledge of what people are like to make generalizations about
human nature."); Harold Kincaid, Confirmation, Complexity and Social Laws, 2 PSA:
PROCEEDINGS BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N 299, 306 (1988) ("The social sciences can, I
believe, produce laws, at least on some occasions. Yet, ceteris paribus clauses, and domain.
specific generalizations predominate. Perhaps their prevalence suggests not that laws do not
exist but that laws are only part of social science explanation.").
1798
2003] TENDENCIES VERSUS BOUNDARIES 1799
pressing in my articles on legal decision theory is that there are few
indisputable and broad tendencies when it comes to irrational
behavior. As a result, it makes little sense, and can be misleading, to
speak of depersonalized, decontextualized irrational tendencies.
In some cases, legal decision theorists do attempt to work out
the details of the rationality research when applying it to the legal
system, as Professor Prentice ably demonstrates with his work on the
possible role of self-serving bias in accounting. 49 But we also find
within legal decision theory listings of one or more "cognitive illusions"
that people "tend" to fall prey to under some vaguely specified
conditions, followed by speculation about how these illusions might
affect legal behavior and how the law might want to respond them.
50
49. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1741-44.
50. Others share this perception. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1058 (2000) ("In the early stages of the movement, legal scholars have been able, by
and large, to make important strides by hypothesizing that empirical and experimental findings
published by social science researchers apply to actors subject to legal commands. To progress
beyond the current initial stage of scholarship, legal scholars will have to conduct more empirical
and experimental work of their own to test whether these hypotheses are in fact true in the
particularized settings they study." (footnote omitted)); see also Rachlinski, Gsupra note 36, at
1225 ("The new field of behavioral law and economics is likely entering a new phase that
recognizes the deeper meaning of the research in cognitive psychology. Scholars will come to
realize that merely identifying how a cognitive error might play out in a legal context is not
sufficient to support a change in law or policy.").
Particularly problematic is the listing of supposed irrational tendencies, especially the
endowment and framing effects and status quo bias, in support of arguments to change default
rules, because default rule changes may implicate many groups of people and types of situations
for which these tendencies have not been shown to hold with any real strength or frequency. See,
e.g., Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy,
and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1243-44 (2002) ("According to well
documented empirical findings, most people define value by focusing on changes (gains and
losses) relative to some reference point. Research into frames has also found that most people
react more decisively to avoid losses than to obtain gains. Put simply, the pain caused by the
loss of $100 is greater than the joy caused by the gain of $100. Reconsider, then, the privacy
notices that imply that consumers may have already opted out or that opting out will accomplish
little. These GLB Act notices present a reference point that suggests to consumers that only
inaction is needed or that at best only relatively small gains are available from opting out.
Finally, to raise an additional tactic of the GLB Act privacy notices, some notices state that
consumers who opt-out may fail to receive 'valuable offers.' This notice creates a frame that
points to opting out as leading only to a loss. By creating a perceived entitlement, the financial
institution seeks to discourage opt-out. Due to the power of frames, a 'notice plus opt-out'
approach may prove unable to alter a lemons equilibrium and have virtually no information
forcing effect. To express this idea more completely, a law requiring notice and an opt-out
default may fail to induce much bargaining so long as the better informed party still controls the
language and form in which the actual data are conveyed. In light of this critique, a notice and
'opt-in' regime might at first appear to be a better choice to create an information forcing default.
Because consent must be procured, the burden shifts to the financial institution to convince a
customer to permit disclosure. The financial organization must therefore explain the benefits of
action, which has the effect of flipping the frame. Opt-in creates an entitlement in the privacy of
personal information, and the customer must be induced to give it up." (footnotes omitted)); Cass
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Behavioral tendencies become little more than a menu of behaviors
ready to be ordered up when a particular type of judgment or decision
is encountered, with little regard for how the larger social setting or
characteristics of the decision maker may alter the tendency. Thus, a
R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 112 (2002) ("Where the Coase
Theorem blunders is in suggesting that no matter the initial allocation of the entitlement, people
will bargain to the same result. The Coase Theorem fails to account for the fact that the initial
allocation seems to create an endowment effect. When the endowment effect is at work, those
who initially receive a legal right value it more than they would if the initial allocation had given
the right to someone else. There is a great deal of evidence to this effect." (footnotes omitted)); id.
at 133 ("Echoing the emerging orthodoxy in behavioral law and economics, I have argued that
the default rule might well matter. If the legal rule has an endowment effect, it is potentially
important to ultimate outcomes, even in the absence of transaction costs. The principal
qualification here is that in some domains, workers and employers might order their affairs with
little or no reference to legal rules. I have also urged that a switch in the default rule, to an
initial allocation in favor of employees, might have the fortunate result of ensuring that
important information is disclosed to employees-a corrective to what seems to be a 'fairness
heuristic' by which people identify likely legal rules. By itself this is an argument in favor of the
switch.").
With respect to legal decision theorists' use of research on the endowment effect (i.e.,
possession may increase value), Russell Korobkin recently wrote:
As might be expected when legal scholars import into their work a concept developed
by and prirarily studied in other disciplines, the sophistication with which the
endowment effect has been used to address legal policy questions varies substantially
across the literature. Legal scholars have universally grasped the most important
positive implication of the endowment effect-that legal entitlements will not change
hands as often in the free market as the status irrelevance assumption implies-and
often have successfully employed this insight to revisit long-standing arguments
about normatively appropriate legal policy. However, two important subtleties
sometimes escape legal scholars' attention: (1) that the existence and extent of the
endowment effect is context-dependent (and, in addition, not fully understood) and (2)
that the explanation for why the endowment effect exists, which is also not well
understood, should often affect its normative implications.
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1229
(2003).
For a detailed discussion of problems with the attempt to use the judgment and decision-
making research to justify enterprise liability ("EL") in product liability law, see James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The
Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213 (2000). Henderson and
Rachlinski conclude that "[t]he chief mistake made by EL's newer advocates lies in
oversimplifying the lessons of cognitive psychology." Id. at 256.
Of course, some of the early work listing cognitive biases and errors and then speculating
about their legal import were meant more to provoke debate than offer definitive prescriptions.
See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1474 (1998) ('The unifying idea in our analysis is that behavioral economics allows us to
model and predict behavior relevant to law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but
with more accurate assumptions about human behavior, and more accurate predictions and
prescriptions about law. Certainly a great deal of work would be necessary to justify a final
evaluation of most of the topics pursued here; there is fertile ground for future research, both
theoretical and empirical, and one of our principal goals is to suggest the directions in which that
research might go."). Nonetheless, these works lack the kind of careful consideration of
contextual influences that Professor Prentice demonstrates in his discussion of accountants and
self-serving bias. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1741-44.
TENDENCIES VERSUS BOUNDARIES
judgment about liability that calls for ex post reflection on a
defendant's ex ante assessment of the risk of danger is said to elicit
the tendency toward "hindsight bias"; a judgment about the liability of
a defendant whose omission caused harm is said to elicit the tendency
toward the "omission bias"; a judgment about a defendant who
engaged in an unconventional but not extraordinarily risky course of
action is said to elicit the tendency toward "normality bias"; and so
on.
51
This menu approach to behavioral description and prediction
follows from the manner in which basic psychological research is
conducted and reported. In a good experiment, a psychologist isolates
the impact of a particular variable of interest on some behavior of
interest and eliminates to the greatest extent possible other
behavioral influences and complicating factors. In this way,
unconfounded causal conclusions may be drawn. 52  Real world
messiness must necessarily be sacrificed for clarity and control. 53 The
psychologist then reports how the variable of interest affected the
behavior, often using tendency talk to do so, as in "the subjects showed
an irrational tendency to take into account nondiagnostic information
in their judgments" (which is also known as the dilution effect). 54
51. The hindsight bias refers to "the tendency to overestimate the degree to which one
would have been able to predict the outcome of an event or the answer to a question after one
has received feedback about one's prediction or after the event has occurred." Elizabeth Creyer &
William T. Ross, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Inferences in Choice: The Mediating Effect of Cognitive
Effort, 55 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 61, 61 (1993) (citation omitted).
The omission bias refers to "the tendency of people to find more blameworthy bad results
that stem from actions than bad results that stem from otherwise equivalent omissions." Robert
A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 583, 587 (2003) (footnote omitted). For a recent reconsideration of the evidence on the
omission bias, with particular attention to omission bias in vaccination decisions, see Terry
Connolly & Jochen Reb, Omission Bias in Vaccination Decisions: Where's the "Omission'? Where's
the "Bias"?, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 186 (2003).
The normality bias refers to "the tendency for people to react more strongly to bad outcomes
that spring from abnormal circumstances than to otherwise identical outcomes that spring from
more ordinary circumstances." Prentice & Koehler, supra, at 588 (footnote omitted).
52. See James Hampton, The Between-Subjects Experiment, in LABORATORY PSYCHOLOGY: A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 15, 21 ("When an experimenter chooses to vary some aspect
of the experimental task, in order to observe its effect, what is manipulated is known as the
independent variable.... The effect that is measured is likewise called the dependent variable
because in this case the value of the measured variable is hypothesised to depend on the
experimental conditions.").
53. See id. at 25 ("In an ideal world, each experiment would have a well motivated
independent variable, and everything else would be exactly the same between conditions.").
54. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 161 n.158 (2000) ("Under the 'dilution effect,'
nondiagnostic information dilutes diagnostic information, leading to less accurate judgments
than where diagnostic information alone is available." (citations omitted)).
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Try to transport these behavioral tendencies outside the
laboratory, however, and one quickly realizes that they carry
tremendously heavy baggage in the form of ceteris paribus clauses into
which all of the complicating factors have been shoved.55 To get a feel
for the size of this problem, choose any behavioral tendency
catalogued within legal decision theory, insert the words "all other
things being equal" into the definition of the tendency, and then try to
enumerate all of the "other things" that must be equal (i.e., held
constant) for this tendency to express itself.
Professor Prentice provides a good example to work with when
he describes the omission bias:
[S]tudies show that when intent, injury, and all other factors are held constant, jurors
will punish more severely defendants whose acts were active rather than passive (for
example, the physician who unplugged the life support machine as opposed to the
physician who failed to plug it in when she had the chance to).
This is evidence of an omission bias.
56
Now what other factors besides intent and (level and type of)
injury must be held constant for the omission bias to appear? A good
number, as it turns out: (1) the normality of the circumstances leading
up to the plaintiffs injury, since Prentice and Koehler have shown
that the normality bias may swamp the omission bias;5 7 (2) the means
by which the omission bias is measured, since Connolly and Reb have
shown that omission bias is not robust across measurement
methods;58 (3) the nature of the particular values at stake, since
Tanner and Medin have shown that omissions to act may be viewed
more harshly than acting when the omissions fail to protect values
55. Daniel Hausman provides a good description of ceteris paribus clauses as they appear in
economics:
Explicit or implict ceteris paribus clauses are pervasive in economics. People do not
always buy more of x when the price of x decreases. The generalization holds only
"other things being equal" or ceteris paribus. Not everybody wants more wealth, but
economists have held that the generalization holds, ceteris paribus. When
government imposes price controls, shortages do not always arise, but, ceteris paribus,
they do.
Daniel M. Hausman, Ceteris Paribus Clauses and Causality in Economics, 2 PSA: PROCEEDINGS
BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N 308, 308 (1988).
56. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1739-40 (first emphasis added).
57. See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 51, at 643 ("In fact, the normality bias is so strong
that it swamps the influence of another well-documented bias-the omission bias-when the two
biases push in different directions." (footnote omitted)).
58. See Connolly & Reb, supra note 51, at 199 ("These studies show that two features of
earlier measures-the truncation of probability response scales, and the asymmetry of open-
response matching scales-could well have produced inadvertent bias in the earlier studies....
Measures that in one form show substantial vaccine aversion show exactly the reverse after
apparently harmless modification, and intendedly convergent measures of the same construct
fail even rudimentary tests of consistency.").
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associated with moral obligations to act;59 (4) the point of view from
which an omission is judged, since instructing subjects to consider how
persons affected by an omission would feel reduces the omission bias;60
and (5) the- age of the subjects, since children appear to be less prone
to the omission bias.61 It should also be noted that these are just the
factors that we now know should be held constant to increase the
chances of the omission bias appearing; there surely are others
waiting to be specifically identified. 62
59. See Carmen Tanner & Douglas L. Medin, Protected Values: No Omission Bias and No
Framing Effects, 10 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. (forthcoming 2003).
60. See Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior-Self-Interested : Moralistic::
Altruistic : Moral, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1150-51 (2003) ("Omission bias is somewhat labile. It
can be reduced by the instructions to take the point of view of those who are affected, e.g., 'If you
were the child, and if you could understand the situation, you would certainly prefer the lower
probability of death. It would not matter to you how the probability came about.' " (footnote
omitted)).
61. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 157 n.270 (discussing developmental
studies of the omission bias and other cognitive biases).
62. In one view, the ceteris paribus clause contains, in the Duhem-Quine sense, the
"auxiliary hypotheses and approximations introduced to give us some sort of measurable
implications in our theoretical models." Neil de Marchi & Jinbang Kim, Ceteris Paribus
Conditions as Prior Knowledge: A View from Economics, 2 PSA: PROCEEDINGS BIENNIAL
MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N 317, 318 (1988); see also DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND
SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 306-07 (1992) ("Piere Duhem... pointed out that one never
tests significant scientific propositions by themselves. Testing an hypothesis involves deriving a
prediction from a conjunction of many propositions, of which the hypothesis is only one. Even if
one could capture formally the requirement that the hypothesis be essential to the deduction,
there would still be the problem that a predictive failure could be due to the falsity of one of
these other propositions. Consequently, one can always 'save' any given hypothesis by casting
the blame on some other claim."). Viewed in the Duhem-Quine sense, it becomes impossible to
identify all of the ceteris paribus conditions (i.e., auxiliary assumptions) that might account for
the failure of a hypothesis.
Even without attributing much practical bite to the Duhem-Quine thesis, see, e.g., DEBORAH
G. MAYO, ERROR AND THE GROWTH OF EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE 456-59 (1996) (discussing how
scientists in practice may overcome the Duhem problem), it should be apparent that it can be
difficult to predict, a priori, which features of the environment must be held constant for a
behavioral tendency to generalize. A recent example from legal decision theory illustrates this
difficulty. Early work by Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein on how jurors set punitive damages
assumed that an averaging of individual mock juror decisions provided a fair representation of
the decisions that actual deliberating juries would reach. Later work showed, however, that
actual deliberating mock juries are likely to be more unpredictable and possibly more extreme in
their punitive damage awards than a process of simply averaging individual juror awards would
have suggested. Compare Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared
Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
49, 68 (1998) ("There is no reason to believe that our main findings would be altered by the
process of group deliberation."), with David Schkade, Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (2000) ("Our
earlier study did not ... involve deliberating juries, and a natural question was whether
deliberating juries would produce similar or quite different results."), and Schkade et al., supra,
at 1143 ("[A]s compared with the median of individual predeliberation judgments, deliberation
significantly increases high dollar awards, increases high punishment ratings, decreases low
punishment ratings, and modestly increases low dollar awards. To summarize a complex
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So we see that a behavioral tendency like the omission bias,
when its ceteris paribus clause is unpacked, can be a rather fragile
contingency likely to exert its influence only under very circumscribed
conditions. This is not to say that the omission bias is unimportant,
because even phenomena that have small or limited behavioral effects
may at times have large negative consequences.6 3  It is to say,
however, that when we have empirical data establishing the
contingent nature of a behavioral tendency, surely we should
acknowledge these limiting conditions rather than bury them in
(typically implicit rather than express) ceteris paribus clauses: 64
"There being no way to avoid ceteris paribus, the second-best strategy
is to detail what is in the pound and lay it bare for examination. 65
Just as importantly, we should recognize how little we know about
many of these limiting conditions, as indicated by the above discussion
of the complex and multiple effects of incentives, group deliberation,
and market interactions on rational behavior. Otherwise, the
prescriptions drawn from legal decision theory run the risk of being
just as unrealistic and predictively inaccurate as prescriptions drawn
from law and economics' unrealistic assumption of perfect rationality.
In sum, rather than lowering my concerns about overreaching
within legal decision theory, the possibility that tendency talk is
becoming the lingua franca of the field heightens my concerns.
Tendency talk permits us to repeat the findings from psychology in
terms that, while not universalistic, still sound like tidy empirical
generalizations with broad implications. Certainly these behavioral
tendencies have a specified context in their definitional statements,
namely, the type of judgment or decision that will evoke the tendency.
This truncated contextualism, however, omits some of the most
analysis, it follows that deliberating juries produce even more unpredictability than was observed
for statistical juries."). Thus, the element of group deliberation-a factor originally consigned to
the ceteris paribus clause-turned out to be quite important to this line of work.
63. See Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1959 ("Factors having small but statistically
significant effects in the laboratory may pale in comparison to the force of other factors in real
world settings. Conversely, it may be possible to isolate those particular situations in which
cognitive biases exert considerable negative causal force on particular people, even if the effect
size appears small." (footnote omitted)).
64. My Equal Incompetence article discusses numerous studies that demonstrate how
particular individual and situational characteristics predictably affect the likelihood that
irrational tendencies will express themselves. See generally Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note
2.
65. de Marchi & Kim, supra note 62, at 323. The impoundment metaphor flows from Alfred
Marshall's famous statement about how economists may simplify the study of a complex
problem: "In breaking it up, he segregates those disturbing causes, whose wanderings happen to
be inconvenient, for the time in a pound called Caeteris Paribus." ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 366 (C.W. Guillebaud ed., 9th ed. 1961).
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interesting and important features of the person and environment
that cause irrational tendencies to dissipate or strengthen.
Professor Prentice does advance two arguments that lessen, if
not completely remove, the threit of misleading inferences being
drawn from legal decision theorists' talk of vaguely delimited
behavioral tendencies. First, he correctly notes that some studies find
substantial numbers of subjects who act irrationally, and, in such
cases, we can be confident that the irrational tendency is strong. 66
Unfortunately, such pervasive patterns of behavior are not always
found (or perhaps I should say, fortunately, since we are talking here
about irrational tendencies), as demonstrated by Professor Prentice's
own empirical research. 67 Instead, we find that irrational "tendencies"
66. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1683-84 (discussing research where large majorities of
subjects seemed to violate rationality norms).
67. A recent empirical study by Professors Prentice and Koehler demonstrates how the
behavior of a subset of experimental subjects can result in the finding of a behavioral tendency,
in this case the "normality bias," or the "tendency for people to react more strongly to bad
outcomes that spring from abnormal circumstances than to otherwise identical outcomes that
spring from more ordinary circumstances." Prentice & Koehler, supra note 51, at 588 (footnote
omitted).
Using two between-subjects experiments, Prentice and Koehler asked groups of subjects to
read scenarios in which a doctor or stockbroker either acted or omitted to act in a way that
constituted either a departure from or towards what would be normal or conventional behavior
for the scenario in question (e.g., in one experimental condition in the first study on medical
malpractice, subjects read about a doctor who, during the course of treatment, changed a cancer
patient's treatment from a conventional to an unconventional treatment protocol). See id. at
622-25 (describing method and materials for first study on medical malpractice). The scenario
informed subjects that the doctor's patient or the stockbroker's client experienced a negative
outcome (death or a significant loss of money), and then subjects were asked, among other
things, to judge the liability of the doctor and stockbroker. Id. at 628-29 (describing method and
materials for second study on stock loss); id. apps. A, B (providing wording of scenarios and
questions presented to subjects). In other words, Prentice and Koehler used an experimental
design in which two levels of two independent variables (the normal/abnormal manipulation and
the active/passive manipulation) were crossed to form four different scenarios in each
experiment, and then, after reading one of the four scenarios, each subject would respond on
dependent variables, including the key dependent variables of assigning liability and possible
damages for negligence. See id at 629-31. For a discussion of the benefits of between-subjects
designs in experiments, see Prentice, supra note 4, at 1679-86.
Prentice and Koehler found that subjects who read about the doctor or stockbroker who
pursued an abnormal approach (i.e., pursued the less conventional route to treatment or
investing) were more likely to hold the doctor or stockbroker liable as compared to subjects who
read about the doctor or stockbroker who pursued a normal approach (i.e., the
normality/abnormality manipulation exerted a statistically significant main effect on ratings of
liability in both experiments). See Prentice & Koehler, supra note 51, at 626 ("In stark contrast
to the results for the active/passive variable, the results for the normal/abnormal variable
yielded significant differences on the key questions."); id. at 630 ("jurors were significantly more
likely to find the financial advisor negligent when the stocks were unconventional than when the
stocks were conventional"). The active/passive manipulation exerted no statistically significant
effect on subjects' responses, and no interaction of the active/passive and the
abnormality/normality variable is reported. See id. at 625 ('The results showed that jurors did
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not treat deaths that resulted from the physician's active deed ... any differently than deaths
that resulted from the physician's passive deed .. "); id. at 629 ("Data from the Stock Loss
experiment showed that the active/passive variable played little, if any, role in jurors' verdicts or
the size of damage awards."). Prentice and Koehler thus concluded that subjects exhibited a
tendency toward the aforementioned "normality bias," and they noted a possible legal
implication of this bias: "a preference for that which is normal may translate into large penalties
for unlucky or negligent mavericks and innovators, and smaller penalties (or even exoneration)
for equally unlucky or negligent rule-followers." Id. at 644.
The following tables summarize the number and percentage of subjects within each
experimental condition who held the doctor or stockbroker liable for negligence. (The published
report of these experiments does not specify the precise number of subjects who participated in
each condition, but Professor Koehler provided me with these numbers through correspondence.
E-mail from Jonathan J. Koehler, Distinguished Teaching Associate Professor, University of
Texas, to Gregory Mitchell, Assistant Professor, Florida State University (Mar. 24, 2003, 8:34
p.m.) (on file with author). Row totals were calculated from the reported percentages of
participants who found the defendant negligent within each specific experimental condition.
The article does not report raw numbers of participants finding the defendant negligent within
each specific experimental condition but rather reports only percentages for each condition.
Accordingly, the raw numbers below for each condition were calculated by multiplying the
number of participants in each condition by the reported percentage of negligence votes in each
condition; due to possible rounding errors, these raw numbers may differ slightly from the actual
number of participants who found the defendant negligent in each condition.)
Malpractice Study (N=211) Active Rx Passive Rx Row Totals
Conventional Rx 48% (27/56) 50% (26/51) 49% (53/107)
Unconventional Rx 68% (38/56) 62% (30/48) 65% (68/104)
"Irrational" % A: 16%
Stockbroker Study (N=92) Active Invest Strategy Passive Invest Strategy Row Totals
Conventional Stock Mix 45% (10/23) 48% (11/23) 46% (21/46)
Unconventional Stock Mix 68% (16/23) 57% (13/23) 63% (29/46)
"Irrational" % A: 17%
Two methodological points should be explained. First, in these experiments, bias is defined
as a statistically significant deviation from perfect verdict consistency across the scenarios. That
is, a bias would be found if there appeared to be a systematic difference in the ratio of liable/not
liable verdicts between the groups. A normality bias is found if such a systematic difference
existed and there are more verdicts for liability when the doctor or stockbroker took an
unconventional rather than conventional approach (i.e., normal or conventional approaches are
judged less harshly). See, e.g., Joachim Krueger, The Bet on Bias: A Foregone Conclusion?, 9
PSYCOLOQUY 1, T 4 (1998) ("The theoretical notion of rational or unbiased reasoning assumes the
feeble status point of a point specific null hypothesis, whereas bias lies in any significant
departure from this point. [Subjects] have ample room to err, but only one place to be correct.
Not surprisingly, NHST reveals that [subjects] 'significantly' miss the point of no bias. With this
asymmetric testing, there is a growing conviction that people are cognitively limited or miserly.
Investigators demonstrate bias by detecting it. They rarely attempt to detect rational
judgment."), at http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000595.
Second, because of the use of a between-subjects design, no individual subject made liability
judgments for each of the scenarios, and therefore no individual subject actually changed
verdicts depending on whether a normal or abnormal course was taken by the defendant. See,
e.g., Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1948-50 (discussing the inferences required in a
between-subjects design to argue that an individual acted irrationally). The best we can do is
assume equivalence of persons across all of the conditions and then infer that the
normality/abnormality manipulation caused the aggregate verdict totals to differ between the
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can be christened even when less than a majority of the research
participants act irrationally. 68  Moreover, even these "strong"
behavioral tendencies are strong only in the numerical sense and not
necessarily in the broader contextualist sense. That is, such findings
remove some concerns about complicating individual difference factors
that might be contained in a ceteris paribus clause, but they do not
remove concerns about ceteris paribus environmental factors.
Second, Professor Prentice notes that some of the laboratory
findings of bias and error have been replicated using subjects other
than college students and sometimes in naturalistic settings. 69 Field
work provides the best test of whether important complicating factors
hide in the ceteris paribus clauses that accompany experimental
groups (i.e., we assume that random assignment to experimental conditions balanced out or
controlled for any individual differences so that we may attribute the differences across groups to
the experimental manipulations). See Camerer, supra note 15, at 633 ('Many people think
within-subjects analysis is the only proper analysis in choice experiments, because [expected
utility] requires consistency of individual preferences. But, of course, between-subjects tests are
equally legitimate (though less powerful) if the subjects in different groups can be presumed to
have the same distribution of tastes, up to sampling error, because they were drawn from a
single population.").
If we assume equivalence across subjects in each of the experimental conditions, then we find
that at least 46% of the subjects in each experiment held the defendant liable for negligence
regardless of whether the defendant acted normally or abnormally (i.e., across all conditions, at
least 46% of the subjects voted for liability), and at least 35% in each experiment held the
defendant not liable for negligence regardless of whether the defendant acted normally or
abnormally. (The proper focus is on the row totals without regard to column totals, because
Prentice and Koehler report only a main effect for the normality/abnormality variable; therefore,
the column totals associated with the two levels of the active/passive variable may be collapsed
and combined due to the lack of an effect for this variable (i.e., we may act as if this variable had
not been tested and ignore the data categories associated with the passive/active variable)). In
each experiment, we may infer that sixteen to seventeen percent of the subjects "switched" their
votes from not liable to liable solely in response to being told that the defendant's approach was
unconventional rather than conventional (i.e., we must assume that the persons who voted for
liability in the unconventional treatment/stock mix conditions would have voted against liability
in the conventional treatment/stock mix conditions). It is this approximately seventeen percent
of the subjects that accounts for the statistically significant percentage of "irrational switches,"
which in turns leads to the finding of a tendency toward normality bias; the fact that the
majority of subjects did not make this irrational "switch" does not lead to a corresponding finding
of a tendency toward rationality.
68. See, e.g., Krueger & Funder, supra note 5, at 18 ("As sample size increases, the precision
of measurement is improved, and more robust statistical tests are employed, ever-smaller effect
sizes pass the threshold of significance. In some cases, this allows biases to reach significance
even when the modal response is identical with the demands of the normative model." (footnote
omitted)); William H. Riker, The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory, 16 POL.
PSYCHOL. 23, 36 (1995) ("None of the experiments displaying inconsistencies in choice portray all
subjects as inconsistent. For experimenters to recommend the abandonment of expected utility
theory when the experiments themselves show that many people-often well over half, as in the
preference reversal experiments-are indeed expected utility maximizers is to ignore the
evidence that the experimenters have themselves created.").
69. See Prentice, supra note 4, at 1698-1702, 1726-29.
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results, and so Professor Prentice does a wonderful service in
collecting research on whether people "in the wild" express the same
irrational tendencies as experimental subjects. 70 This work possesses
great utility in the effort to build better models of behavior than the
perfect rationality model.71 The relative ease of experimental work
results in too little field work relative to experimental work, and close
inspection of this field work often confirms the view that
environmental features do matter, and that no simple conclusions flow
from rationality research. 72
The problem with experimental replications that use
professionals and experts as subjects, rather than the usual sample of
undergraduates (i.e., replications in the lab rather than the field but
using the "real world" target populations as the subjects), is that these
replications likewise yield no simple answers, sometimes providing
strong support and sometimes weak support for the bias and error
portrait of cognition. This mixed evidence is the natural result of the
fact that individuals differ significantly in their propensities to act
rationally. 73 Indeed, to be faithful to the data, Professor Prentice must
describe these findings in terms of behavioral tendencies of varying
strengths and specificity that imply unknown ceteris paribus
70. Id.; see Edwin A. Locke, Generalizing from Laboratory to Field: Ecological Validity or
Abstraction of Essential Elements, in GENERALIZING FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD SETTINGS 3, 7-8
(Edwin A. Locke ed., 1986) ("[Wlhat is needed when trying to determine the legitimacy of
generalization is the identification of the essential features of field settings that need to be
replicated in the lab (that is, essential subject, task, and setting characteristics). Just what is
essential cannot necessarily be known in advance; discovering these essentials is an inductive
procedure though plausible hypotheses can be used as guidelines .... A key function of lab
studies then would be to identify and isolate these essential features so that they could be
reproduced in field settings. If generalization succeeded, this would support the validity of the
features isolated. If generalization failed, it would imply that one or more essential features had
been omitted.").
71. For an excellent use of field work to compare the relative explanatory power of the
standard economic model (expected utility) and behavioral model (prospect theory), see Colin F.
Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES 288 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). With respect to the transactions
considered, the behavioral model arguably did a better explanatory job than the economic model.
See id. at 299 ("[P]rospect theory is a suitable replacement for expected utility because it can
explain anomalies.. . and can also explain the most basic phenomena expected utility is used to
explain.").
72. Compare, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard M. Thaler, Do Security Analysts
Overreact?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 52, 57 (1990) ("The same pattern of overreaction found in the
predictions of naive undergraduates is replicated in the predictions of stock market
professionals."), with Michael P. Keane & David E. Runkle, Are Financial Analysts' Forecasts of
Corporate Profits Rational?, 106 J. POL. ECON. 768, 797 (1998) ("The evidence in this paper
strongly supports the view that professional stock market analysts make rational forecasts of
earnings per share for the companies they follow.").
73. See Mitchell, Incompetence, supra note 2, at 87-105, 139-60 (discussing research on
various individual differences in rationality).
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constraints: "statistical experts are sometimes as prone to committing
the conjunction fallacy as lay people"; "increased knowledge often
correlates with increased overconfidence"; "experts often are no better
than laypeople at making predictions"; "judges, although less
susceptible than jurors, are subject to 'a strong hindsight bias effect";
"professional blackjack players tend to be subject to the omission
bias."74
Most importantly, the replication of statistically significant
findings of biases and errors in college students in "real world"
populations should not lead to the conclusion that these replications
have practical, real world significance. While the replications may in
some instances be of practical significance, a finding of statistical
significance inside or outside the lab does not guarantee practical
significance. 75 Only an examination of the circumstances under which
the effect is found can lead to an assessment of practical significance. 76
74. Prentice, supra note 4, at 1727-28 (footnotes omitted).
75. For a discussion of the distinction between statistical and practical significance, and the
possible pernicious effects of the pervasive use of statistical significance testing in psychology,
see Mitchell, Pessimism, supra note 2, at 1954-60. The essential problem arises from
psychology's heavy reliance on null hypothesis significance testing ("NHST') to demonstrate
behavioral tendencies: because NHST focuses on averages across groups and is sensitive to
sample size and not merely effect size, it is possible that fairly small real differences in behavior
between groups or fairly small percentages of subjects within each experimental group
expressing irrational behavior will lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis and a finding of an
irrational tendency. Id.
Professor Prentice's response to my concerns about NHST does not dispute the need for a
distinction between practical and statistical significance, but he does argue that there is evidence
that many findings of statistical significance also possess practical significance. See Prentice,
supra note 4, at 1687-89.
76. For example, the practical significance of research into jury bias must be evaluated in
light of the consistent finding that strength of evidence is generally the best predictor of jury
decisions. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 684-86 (2001) ("Strength of evidence
(SOE) is a global term referring to the quantity and quality of evidence presented by the
plaintiff/prosecution during a trial. There is no doubt that SOE has an effect on jury verdicts-
the real issue is to what extent.... Overall, theoretical ambiguity regarding what makes a case
'compelling' and the lack of an accepted metric for its measurement make it difficult to quantify
precisely the impact of SOE on jury decisions. Nonetheless, efforts to manipulate SOE or capture
its natural variation have produced large and robust effects on jury verdicts and postdeliberation
verdict preferences as well as evidence of interaction with other variables .... In summary, there
is ample evidence supporting the conclusion that SOE is the primary determinant of jury
verdicts in criminal trials in most circumstances, but it remains to be determined how important
SOE is relative to the many irrelevant biasing factors that may influence jury verdicts."
(citations omitted)); id. at 701 ("Furthermore, studies that have observed bias attributable to
procedural and/or participant characteristics have tended to involve ambiguous evidence. In
particular, biasing factors (e.g., pretrial publicity) have been found to have little to no impact
when SOE is weak or very strong and have their greatest influence on jury decisions when SOE
is moderate."); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 19 (1997) ("[Elvery researcher who does mock jury
experiments is acutely aware that the case facts need to be pretested and adjusted lest they
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Once we accept the messiness of the world we are trying to
model, and the concomitant complexities and uncertainties in the
behavioral evidence on rationality, legal decision theory may be able
to move from its many vague ceteris paribus claims to sets of
"restricted laws": "If a theorist believes that in a certain domain the
interferences inadequately denoted by the implicit ceteris paribus
clause are absent, he or she can regard the generalization in that
domain as a restricted law."77  Some recent work in legal decision
theory seeks to do just this, by carefully examining the complex
evidence on particular behavioral phenomena and considering the
limits on transporting this evidence to legal settings. 78
The first principle of legal decision theory should be to go
wherever the data takes us, rather than always to reject the
rationality assumption of law and economics or to assume that legal
actors' irrational tendencies chronically lead to real world mistakes-
as Professor Rachlinski persuasively argued recently. 79 If the data
reveal that the rationality assumption better fits the evidence in a
particular setting (as may be the case, for example, when DNA
evidence is presented to juries using natural frequency and graphical
formats rather than probability formats alone80), then we should favor
swamp the (usually more subtle) variables that are the focus of the study. In order to maximize
the possibility of detecting the effects of variables under study, researchers usually aim to
produce cases that are ambiguous, that bring jurors near the midpoint of the scale of voting
preferences. This insight from the experimenter's craft bespeaks a widely held, if sometimes
unacknowledged, awareness of the power of case information." (footnote omitted)).
77. Hausman, supra note 55, at 310 (citation omitted). Elsewhere I discuss in detail how
legal decision theory might make this move toward a more contextualized account of behavior.
See Gregory Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. (forthcoming).
78. See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1115, 1156-62 (2003) (discussing limitations on the application of prospect theory research to the
law); Korobkin, supra note 50, at 1293 ("As empirical research continues to deepen our
understanding both about the contexts in which the endowment effect does and does not operate
and the causes that drive the endowment effect in those contexts, endowment effect analysis will
continue to become more precise, more conclusive, and more useful in the design of legal policy.").
79. See Rachlinski, supra note 36, at 1206-25 (discussing the adaptive nature of thought
and behavior and how these adaptations cloud the case for paternalistic reforms within legal
decision theory); see also id. at 1168 ("The principal lesson of cognitive psychology is not that
people make mistakes. Rather, the lesson is that people develop complex, contextual strategies
for making choices.")
80. See, e.g., Samuel Lindsey et al., Communicating Statistical DNA Evidence, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 147, 160 (2003) ("Experts and nonexperts alike are easily confused by statistics
expressed as probabilities. But this confusion diminishes when the same statistics are expressed
as natural frequencies. We found that presenting the same statistical evidence as natural
frequencies rather than conditional probabilities dramatically increased the proportion of correct
statistical inferences by trained legal decisionmakers and influenced the verdicts in each case.");
Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace
Evidence With a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 JURIMETRIOS
J. 403, 437 & 448 app. B (2002) (finding that frequency formats led to less accurate assessments
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the rationality assumption in that restricted setting. If legal decision
theory overlooks those parts of the evidence that fail to justify
paternalistic arguments and oversells those parts of the evidence that
support arguments to convert the government into an irrationality
monitor, then it will become a political movement rather than a
scientific endeavor-and its lifespan will probably be quite short.S'
III. CONCLUSION
To conclude, I return to my opening suggestion that perhaps
Professor Prentice and I have fallen under the spell of biased
assimilation processes in our treatments of psychological research on
human rationality. If this is true, one should not assume that such a
bias is necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, the philosopher of science
Miriam Solomon argues that "cognitive bias and belief perseverance"
may be "in fact conducive to scientific success."8 2 This is so because
cognitive and motivational biases in scientific reasoning may lead to a
"distribution of research effort wherever differences in individual
experience and prior belief arise."8 3 Such a distribution of interests
and effort may lead to the development of competing theories, the
formulation of severe tests of theories with which one disagrees, and,
ultimately, the separation of stronger from weaker theories.8 4 In short,
persistently holding onto our own idiosyncratic theories, even past
of DNA evidence compared to a chart format in which the links between prior and posterior
probabilities given a particular likelihood ratio are graphically presented). The DNA evidence
example illustrates how behavioral evidence on human capabilities and limitations may be
combined to find those settings most conducive to rational judgment. A single-minded focus on
finding irrational tendencies, which neglects finding the boundaries on these tendencies, would
not lead to this adaptive approach.
81. In this respect, I certainly hope that Professor Prentice is correct in his observation that
"[e]ven less than law and economics, legal decision theory seems to belong to no particular
political camp." Prentice, supra note 4, at 1763.
82. Miriam Solomon, Scientific Rationality and Human Reasoning, 59 PHIL. SCI. 439, 443
(1992).
83. Id. at 452. Solomon is careful to note the speculative nature of this claim, which was
formulated from a study of the revolution in geology caused by debate about continental drift
theory. See id. at 444-52.
84. Professor Prentice makes a similar point: "Indeed, it is 'not so much the critical attitude
that individual scientists have taken with respect to their own ideas that has given science its
success ... but more the fact that individual scientists have been highly motivated to
demonstrate that hypotheses that are held by some other scientists are false."' Prentice, supra
note 4, at 1678 (quoting KEITH E. STANOVICH, HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 33
(6th ed. 2001)); see also Philip Kitcher, The Division of Cognitive Labor, 87 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1990)
("Whereas it may be rational for each of the scientists to believe the theory that is better
supported by the available evidence, it may not be rational for each of them to pursue that
theory, and what the community cares about is the distribution of pursuit not the distribution of
belief.").
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some ideal point of rational belief, may, in the long run, be the best
way to develop a coherent body of knowledge that can improve public
policy.
So perhaps it is a good thing that I have not persuaded
Professor Prentice to be more skeptical about the application of
psychological research to the law and that Professor Prentice, despite
his good arguments, has not yet persuaded me to be bolder in my
applications of psychology to the law. Persistence in our views-even
irrational persistence-may eventually lead to a brighter future for
legal decision theory as competing arguments sort themselves out
through further testing and debate.
War and American Constitutional
Order
Mark E. Brandon 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1815 (2003)
This essay explores the relationship between armed conflict and
constitutionalism in light of the experience of the United States. The rela-
tionship is fraught with tension, for while force may be necessary for creat-
ing or maintaining a constitutional order, it can also endanger the dura-
bility of constitutionalism in the order. Armed conflict has been such a
persistent presence from the inception of the American nation that it is ap-
propriate to characterize the United States as a "warrior state." The pres-
ence and persistence of militarism threaten to injure constitutionalist
norms and institutions. There are five areas of concern in the American
case: national ethos, rights, the operation of republican government, the
allocation of institutional authority, and sovereignty. The essay concludes
by offering a framework for further investigating the constitutional impli-
cations of armed conflict.

